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•  Experimentation and Research Framework  
–  High Assurance Solutions 
–  Distributed Multilevel Functionality  
–  Dynamic Security 
–  Trusted Authentication 
–  Open Architectures and Interfaces 
•  Currently Support: 
–  MYSEA Research Project 
–  Trusted Computing Exemplar Project 
–  Dynamic Security Services Project 
–  Basic GIG IA Architecture and Security Concepts  
•  Long Range Applicability 
–  Additional GIG IA experiments 
–  Other Complex Enterprise Networks 
MYSEA Testbed Objectives  
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Near-Term Testbed Experiments  
•  Secure connections to classified networks 
•  Use COTS and legacy hardware and software components 
•  Use open standards 
•  Apply high assurance security technology to legacy elements 
•  Centralize security management 
•  Integrate high assurance multilevel security with existing 
sensitive networks 
•  Manage access to classified networks using high assurance 
trusted communication channel techniques  
•  Dynamic security services 
•  Open architectures to incorporate new technologies 
•  Use XML tags as security markings 
•  Secure single sign-on across multiple MLS servers 
•  Server cluster technologies 
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Testbed Architecture 
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Testbed Design 
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Demonstrated MYSEA Features 
•  Distributed Security Architecture 
•  Multilevel Policy Enforcement 
•  Unmodified Commercial Desktop Applications 
•  Trusted Path for Security-Critical Operations 
•  Reach-back to Single Level Networks 
–  Aggregated Information Services 
•  Dynamic Policy Modulation of Security Services 
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Testbed Components Secure Server 
•  True Multilevel Security Policy Enforcement 
–  Coherent View: Users at HIGH see Information at LOW 
–  Label-based Policy Enforcement 
•  Hierarchical and Categories 
–  Support for Integrity-Based Separation 
•  Isolate cyber-trash from reliable users and programs 
–  Flexible Label Management 
•  Existing Commercial MLS Base 
–  Digital Net XTS-400 
–  Evaluated at Class B3 under TCSEC (aka “Orange 
Book”) 
–  Currently Under Evaluation under Common Criteria 
–  Support for Certification and Accreditation Goals 
January 2006 8 
Server Network Enhancements  
•  Multilevel “inetd” 
•  Distributed High Assurance Authentication on MLS LAN  
–  Trusted Path Services at Server 
–  Distributed TCB to Client Locations 
•  Trusted Path Extensions (TPE) at Clients 
–  Controls TPE Activities 
•  Secure Session Services 
–  Launch Applications at Corrected Session Level 
•  Dynamic Security Services  
–  Policy Management Initiator  
•  Dedicated and Multiplexed Connections to Single Level 
Networks 
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Server Application Enhancements 
•  Ports of Popular Applications 
–  All Made “Multilevel Aware” 
–  HTTP:  Apache-like Web Server 
•  Base – standard Apache – minor modifications 
•  WebDAV under development 
–  SMTP:  Sendmail 
–  IMAP: University of Washington 
–  NFS: User-level port 
–  Secure Shell:  OpenSSH (Single Level Only) 
•  Remote Client-Side Applications Support 
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High Assurance Trusted Path/Channel 
•  Trusted Path Extension Device 
–  Ensure Communication with Trusted Server 
–  Based on EAL7 Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) 
Separation Kernel 
•  Remote Security Operations 
–  Log-on, Session Level Negotiation, etc. 
•  Server Supports Session Suspension and Resumption 
•  Trusted Channel Module 
–  Ensure Proper Security Level Assigned To Information 
From Legacy Networks 
•  Dynamic Security Services Responders 
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Commodity-Based Client 
•  Meet User Requirements 
–  Web Browsing 
–  Mail 
–  Document Production 
•  Stateless To Address Object Reuse Requirements 
–  Depot-level Configuration to Start Up in Useful State 
–  Volatile Memory Only 
–  Store State at Server at Appropriate Session Level 
–  Working Prototypes:   
•  Knoppix Linux 
•  Windows XP Embedded 
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Web Portal Services 
•  Allow Reach-Back to Single Level Legacy Networks via 
Web Browser 
•  Part of MYSEA’s Stateless Client Strategy 
•  Tarantella/enView product suite 
–  Allow Clients to Access Web-based Applications On 
Different Platforms (Windows, Linux, Unix) 
–  Present Integrated Portal View To Users 
•  Support GCCS 
–  Command and Control Personal Computer System 
(C2PC) 
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Testbed Phase I 
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Phase I Configuration (1 of 2) 
•  Hardware:  35 components 
–  MLS Server, Handheld TPEs, Desktops, 
Laptops, VPN Appliances, Network Switches, 
TACLANE Encryptors 
•  Operating Systems:  Heterogeneous 
–  Trusted OS:  DigitalNet STOP 
–  COTS OS: RedHat Linux, Microsoft Windows 
2000 server, Microsoft Windows XP, Microsoft 
Windows XP Embedded, OpenBSD, Knoppix 
Linux and Familiar Project Linux 
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•  Custom MYSEA Trusted Software 
–  Trusted Path Service, Secure Session Management 
•  Linux Applications:   
–  PostgreSQL, Apache web server, Edge Technologies 
enPortal, Tarantella Enterprise 3, imapd and sendmail 
•  Windows Applications:   
–  Microsoft Terminal Services, Microsoft Office, Microsoft 
Project, Internet Explorer, C2PC Gateway, C2PC Client, 
REPEAT 2004–RepeatWinXR and Creative WebCam 
PROeX 
Phase I Configuration (2 of 2) 
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Trusted Path Extension  (TPE) 
•  Reference application for the TCX project 
•  Operational Environment - MYSEA MLS LAN 
•  Architecture will use separation 
–  Untrusted and Trusted processes 
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TPE Form Factor 
•  PDA-like device 
•  Isolation from COTS processor  
•  Trusted Path functions control I/O to user 
–  Device Screen 
–  Device Keyboard 
•  Secure Attention Key design is simpler 
•  Encryption is on TPE 
•  Alternative: examine complex interactions between TPE 
and COTS system 
–  Strong isolation is required for assurance 
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